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ABSTRACT 
Since the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was labeled a strategic competitor to 
the United States, it has become essential to understanding the strategy and expansion of 
its global influence. The PRC has the largest and fastest-growing navy in the world and 
intends to use it to support and protect its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the mechanism 
of global influence via infrastructure investment. The PRC’s efforts are expensive and 
widespread, creating an illusion of inevitability and success against the Western-
controlled world order. This thesis examines PRC expansionism through a model built 
upon the concepts of Wei Qi, an ancient game that is won by having the most influence 
or control of the board, develops strategic thinking, and creates an understanding of an 
opponent’s interests and opportunities. The thesis applies the Wei Qi model to the nations 
of Australia and Djibouti, demonstrating its applicability to understanding the PRC’s 
global ambitions and strategic gains in areas where the United States is present. The Wei 
Qi model also highlights the limited effectiveness of the PRC’s economic-centric 
approach and provides holistic and balanced options for the United States to counter PRC 
expansionism.
v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vi 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. WEI QI GAMEPLAY ................................................................................2 
B. THE RULES ...............................................................................................3 
C. THE BOARD AND SEQUENCING ........................................................4 
D. IMPORTANT CONCEPTS OF WEI QI .................................................7 
E. THE ENVIRONMENT OF COMPETITION ........................................9 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW ...................................................................................13 
A. WEI QI AND ITS APPLICATION TO CHINESE HISTORY 
AND STRATEGY ...................................................................................13 
B. CAN WEI QI BE A HEURISTIC MODEL? .......................................16 
C. HOW DOES WEI QI REFLECT GREAT POWER 
COMPETITION? ....................................................................................17 
D. LITERATURE GAPS .............................................................................19 
E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES ....................................................20 
F. SOURCES .................................................................................................21 
G. BREAKING DOWN THE WEI QI MODEL ........................................21 
H. THE GAME BOARD IMAGINED ........................................................24 
III. AUSTRALIA AND THE WALL ........................................................................27 
A. APPLYING THE WEI QI MODEL .......................................................28 
1. Where Is the Case Study On the Board? In the Game? ...........28 
2. What Is the Amount of and Use of Zheng and Qi in the 
Area? .............................................................................................29 
3. Are These Forces Becoming Overwhelming with 
Irresistible Power Across All Aspects of DIME? ......................37 
4. Are These Forces Developing a Favorable Situation with 
Great Potential to Achieve Political Objective? ........................39 
5. Is China Taking and Maintaining the Initiative? Is There 
a Void to Fill? ...............................................................................40 
6. Is the Relationship Between China and the Country a Ko? .....40 
7. What Is the Framework That the Forces Are Providing? 
What Strategy Is Being Used? What Liberties Do the 
Pieces Provide? .............................................................................40 
B. CONCLUSION: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE UNITED 
STATES ....................................................................................................41 
IV. DJIBOUTI: THE GATEWAY TO THE CENTER .........................................43 
viii 
A. APPLYING THE WEI QI MODEL .......................................................44 
1. Where Is the Case Study On the Board? In the Game? ...........44 
2. What Is the Amount of and Use of Zheng and Qi in the 
Area? .............................................................................................45 
3. Are These Forces Becoming Overwhelming with 
Irresistible Power Across All Aspects of DIME? ........................47 
4. Are These Forces Developing a Favorable Situation with 
Great Potential to Achieve Political Objective? ..........................48 
5. Is China Taking and Maintaining the Initiative? Is There a 
Void to Fill? ...................................................................................49 
6. Is the Relationship Between China and the Country a Ko? .......49 
7. What Is the Framework That the Forces Are Providing? 
What Strategy Is Being Used? What Liberties Do the 
Pieces Provide?..............................................................................49 
B. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................51 
V. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................53 
A. INTERPRETATION OF THE MODEL ...............................................53 
B. WEI QI MODEL AND FUTURE ANALYSIS ......................................54 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................55 




LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1. Basic Rules of the Game ..............................................................................4 
Figure 2. Standard Blank 19 x 19 Board .....................................................................5 
Figure 3. Geography of Wei Qi ...................................................................................6 
Figure 4. Baseline Game Board Representation .......................................................25 
Figure 5. Australian Representation on the Game Board ..........................................29 
Figure 6. Representation of Djibouti on the Game Board .........................................44 
Figure 7. BRI Network November 2020 ...................................................................50 
  
x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Wei Qi Model .............................................................................................21 
 
xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
Ajin The sense that something that has taste or lingers, the effect of 
actions 
ANZUS Australia, New Zealand, United States mutual defense agreement 
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations 
AUS Australia 
Baduk Korean name for Wei Qi 
BRI Belt and Road Initiative 
CCP  Chinese Communist Party 
CHAFTA China–Australia Free Trade Agreement 
CNA Center for Naval Analyses  
CPTTP Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific 
Partnership 
DIME Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic levers of 
national power 
G20 Group of Twenty, international forum for governments and central 
bank governors from 19 countries and the European Union 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
Go Japanese name for Wei Qi 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
Ko A life or death situation, strategic national interests, red line criteria 
Liberties  the four cardinal points of a stone, the opportunities any action 
provides 
MARTA Mega Regional Trade Agreement 
NPS Naval Postgraduate School 
OBOR One Belt, One Road 
PLAN People’s Liberation Army-Navy 
PRC People’s Republic of China 
Qi The extraordinary use of forces, abnormal use of national power 
RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership  
Shi the alignment of forces, the propensity of things, or the potential 
born of disposition 
xiv 
SLOC Sea Lines of Communication 
SOE State Owned Enterprise 
Territory Region or location in which influence can be carved out 
TPP  Trans Pacific Partnership 
UN United Nations 
UNLOS United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea 
Wei Qi Ancient Chinese board game, means encirclement game or 
encirclement chess 
WHO World Health Organization 
WTO World Trade Organization 






I would like to thank my family for the hours of patient listening and insightful 
comments as I verbally worked out this idea in my head. Special thanks to Dr. Doug Borer 
and Dr. Thomas Jamison on their calm guidance and encouragement through this process. 
Also want to thank my fellow classmates of the Defense Analysis Department who have 
helped build this concept along the way.  
  
xvi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) continued military and economic growth, 
illegitimate island building; and aggressive actions in the region surrounding the South 
China Sea have been recognized as threats to U.S. global strategic interests. Within both 
the military and academic literature there has been much analysis and debate, not only on 
the nature of this behavior but also how to limit and counter it. To date that focus has been 
centered mainly within the first island chain. The first island chain being the group of 
nations ranging from Japan down to Indonesia, including the busy Sea Lines of 
Communications (SLOC) of the South China Sea and East China Sea. This perspective 
potentially blinds decision makers and planners to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 
grander strategic plan and exposes the United States to envelopment by Chinese influence 
and power in the greater Indo-Pacific region. 
A potential corrective lens through which to examine and shape a response to CCP 
strategic actions is to apply lessons from the ancient board game of Wei Qi. A two-player 
strategy game, which uses stones to represent forces and influence and traces its roots to 
the time of Sun Tzu and the Warring States period (c. 475–221 BC). Examining Wei Qi is 
beneficial in processing CCP strategy not because of its cultural origins but because of how 
the game replicates the current global competitive climate created by the international 
world order and the limitations Nuclear Deterrence puts upon the players against 
aggressive actions encouraging the use of hybrid warfare. 
This thesis first presents the gameplay, concepts and perspective of Wei Qi. Next it 
explores the current environment in which the two players, the U.S. and the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), inhabit and how Wei Qi gameplay replicates those conditions. 
Finally, it uses Wei Qi structure and the concept of “reading,” or strategic analysis, to 
develop a model to help military planners, analysts and decision makers to ask the relevant 
questions when observing CCP actions in the grey zone. Once developed, the model is 
applied to two case studies, one examining Australia and the other Djibouti, both of which 
have relevance to the U.S. and PRC for Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic 
(DIME) reasons. The case studies describe the historic bi-lateral relationships between 
2 
those countries and China, and then apply the Wei Qi model of analysis. Using this 
technique produces a well-rounded understanding of the importance each country has to 
China, the levers of influence China is using, and how effective they are, and helps infer 
ways the United States could employ their own pressure to counter.  
A. WEI QI GAMEPLAY 
Wei Qi, which translated from Mandarin means “encircling chess” or “encirclement 
board game,” is an ancient two-player strategy game that is often compared to chess and 
its influence upon military and political strategy in the West.1 Both board games adhere to 
a set of rules and game mechanics that encourage planning one’s own moves ahead, 
understanding your opponent, observing his or her actions and projecting the possible 
outcomes of their decisions. Their differences are in the game mechanics and the objective 
of the players which result in different strategies and processes. Wei Qi’s objective is to 
own the most territory on the board or to encircle the opponent, whereas in chess, the goal 
is to capture the king and achieve complete capitulation. These differences in objectives 
shift the perspective of gameplay, decision making and the pace of the games. The game 
pieces are also a noticeable difference. In Wei Qi simple white and black stones are used 
and they are restricted to a single move or placement on the board. Chess uses multiple 
pieces, each has their own rules on how they can be captured and how they can move across 
the board. These differences in game mechanics and piece movement speak to the different 
cultural representations and perceptions within each game. Chess’ rules reflecting 
medieval European ideas of class separation and the inherent differences in capability 
between them.2 Whereas, Wei Qi stones represented a single person and how it takes 
coordination and planning to claim territory and victory. This strategic perspective reflects 
the battles for dominance in the era of Warring States, which saw small kingdoms 
competing for power and influence through military might, deception, and political 
 
1 David Lai, “Learning from the Stones: A Go Approach to Mastering China’s Strategic Concept, 




maneuvering in ancient China.3 Another way the two games differ is in the way they define 
victory, chess requiring capitulation or capturing of the King. In Wei Qi, the winner is the 
player who controls the most territory on the board, which can be done by the narrowest of 
margins and only controlling 51% of the board. This perspective of narrow victory and 
understanding that losses of territory to your opponent will occur is a key aspect of the 
strategic thought of the game.  
B. THE RULES 
The rules of Wei Qi are relatively simple and are laid out in Figure 1 as described 
in Scott Boorman’s The Protracted Game.4 Despite the simplicity of the rules, the 
gameplay develops into a mixture of multiple tactical actions and small stratagems across 
the board that coalesce into a larger strategy in order to achieve a victory by even the 
smallest of margins. In Wei Qi, the winner is the one who mathematically owns more of 
the board, meaning that victory can be won with 51% of the board. The rules also indicate 
a sense of cooperation between the players, who while competing there is an order to the 
play and agreement on when there are no other options available. This development of a 
cooperative cum competitive environment is a small but significant reminder of what the 
relationship between the two great powers can be.  
 
3 Sun Tzu, “The Art of War.” (New York, Oxford University Press, 1963). 
4 Scott A. Boorman, The Protracted Game; a Wei-Chʻi Interpretation of Maoist Revolutionary 
Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969). 
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Figure 1. Basic Rules of the Game 
There are additional rules that are applied in professional matches when there is a 
handicap between players of different skill levels. For the purposes of this analysis, those 
rules are not required, though an argument could be made that the U.S. has already been 
given this benefit by being the sole hegemon for the past 30 years with a distinct advantage 
in the economic and military realm.  
C. THE BOARD AND SEQUENCING 
Another unique feature of Wei Qi and a major difference between Chess is the board 
on which the game is played. The game board in Chess is an 8 x 8 grid normally of black 
and white tiles. Each tile is a position that can be taken by another piece as long as the rules 




Figure 2. Standard Blank 19 x 19 Board5 
However, it is not the tiles that are important or counted but the intersections on 
where the lines meet is where pieces are placed. Another key difference is that in Chess 
the pieces are arranged at the start of the game on opposing sides, creating a strict border 
and sense of ownership to a side of the board. In Wei Qi, the board is blank and a player 
can start placing pieces anywhere there is an open spot. The players in Wei Qi must develop 
their own areas, and until strong positions are created, the opposing player has the 
opportunity to limit the size and development of these territories.  
Sequencing within Wei Qi is similar to sequencing in military planning; there are 
different phases in a campaign and areas of the board that are focused on during those 
phases of the game. There are two limiting factors that create these phases in the game: the 
number of intersections on the board and the number of pieces that each player possesses. 
There are 361 intersections on a 19 x 19 grid, and the white player has 180 pieces, while 
the black has 181. Black gets the extra piece because it starts first and normally is the 
identified weaker or junior player. The interaction between the intersections and number 
of pieces create the three phases of the game: opening, middle and end phase correlating 
 
5 Source: Mateusz Hudzikowski, “The Go Game Model in International Politics Research,” Strategic 
Impact 49, no. 4 (2013): 79–91. 
6 
to the number of plays, with moves 1–50 being the opening phase, 51–100 the middle and 
moves 101–180 being the end. Traditionally, this means a player is focusing on the three 
major “geographic points” of the board: the corners in the beginning, the walls during the 
middle and the center during the end phase. These geographical points are displayed in 
Figure 3. 
 
Top left: Corners should be focused on in the beginning; Top right: Wall should be focused 
on during the middle portion of the game; bottom: Center will be the final competition area 
for game6 
Figure 3. Geography of Wei Qi 
There are no rules stating that a player must start by building in the corners, but it 




and guarantee some ownership of the board. The transition to the walls next allows a player 
to continue taking ownership of the board without overextending their reach and exposing 
gains to the opponent. The walls tend to either help enhance or limit the players corners, 
depending on how aggressive each player is and how much a player can deceive or distract 
the opponent. The center is normally the area where the game ends because it is where the 
corners and extending walls meet and players vie for the last pieces of real estate in order 
to win. Within these limitations of moves and these “geographical regions,” players can 
attempt a nearly limitless amount of stratagems and tactics in order to carve out the most 
territory.  
D. IMPORTANT CONCEPTS OF WEI QI 
With an understanding of the rules and geography of the board, there are a couple 
of key concepts of Wei Qi that should be explored. These are the ideas of territory, liberties 
and its relation to life and death of the pieces, Ko, Aji and Shi. These basic concepts of Wei 
Qi are the fundamental building blocks of strategic thinking within the game. Another 
aspect of Wei Qi that a player and reader of this thesis must understand is that the game has 
regional presence. In Korea the game is known as Baduk and Japan it is known as Go. As 
such, many concepts and definitions are multi-lingual and are best understood in those 
other languages and will appear in this thesis as such. 
Territory on the game board is empty points that are surrounded, or controlled by a 
player. Control in this instance means that the “open space” inside the territory controlled 
by player A is within a living group, or group that can capture any stone that player B 
attempts to place in there. The goal of the game is to try and develop these territories in 
order to take up as much of the board as possible. This creates a realization that one’s 
opponent will also control territory and there is nothing that can be done about that.  
Liberties are the empty space or open points that are adjacent to a stone on the 
board, with a single stone potentially having four liberties. The number of liberties can be 
increased by creating a chain of stones, which adds together their available liberties, 
making them stronger and more resilient. Liberty is the English word for this concept, with 
Dame being the Japanese and qi being the Chinese word for them. The Chinese word qi is 
8 
defined as breath, meaning these stones are breathing or alive. If a stone or chain of stones 
were to lose their liberties that, would mean that they no longer are breathing and are dead. 
This is how stones are captured and neutralized: by the opponent encircling the chain and 
taking away their liberties. Hence, a chain or territory that has a significant amount of 
liberties can survive and is less open to being captured.  
A Ko is a life or death situation where two alternating single stone captures would 
repeat the original board position. The alternating captures could repeat indefinitely, 
preventing the game from ending. This normally occurs in an area where the players have 
territories meeting on the board and the determination of the Ko, will mean a potential loss 
of that chain. The Ko rule was created to avoid an indefinite stalemate: if one player 
captures the Ko, the opponent is prohibited from recapturing the Ko immediately. While 
this might seem like it means a potential loss, it creates an opportunity to either play the 
board to increase the liberties of the chain for a small loss, or a player can use the Ko rule 
to create space to move in another part of the board. The key aspect of a Ko is the 
determination of the potential losses of the Ko outweigh further gains somewhere else on 
the board.  
The final main concept to understand is the idea of Shi and what it means for 
strategy and approach to Wei Qi. According to a pentagon report on the Chinese military 
in 2002, “there is no Western equivalent to the concept of “shi.” Chinese linguists explain 
it as “the alignment of forces,” the “propensity of things,” or the “potential born of 
disposition,” that only a skilled strategist can exploit to ensure victory over a superior force. 
Similarly, only a sophisticated assessment by an adversary can recognize the potential 
exploitation of “shi.”7 According to David Lai, Shi is a strategy and process of exploiting 
the strategic configuration of power.8 Shi is not only what the environment is but also the 
ability to manipulate it and create opportunities to achieve a goal.  
 
7 Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress on the Military Power of the People’s Republic 
of China, July 2002 (Department of Defense, 2002), 6. 
8 Lai, “Learning from the Stones,” 1. 
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This idea is related to the game concept of Aji, which in Japanese is “the sense that 
something that has taste lingers” or in Chinese Weidao. Within the game of Wei Qi its 
usage refers to lingering possibilities left in a position. These possibilities are latent and 
usually cannot be used immediately, but rather may come to life at later points in the game. 
This is why Aji is also often translated as potential. Shi is understanding this potential and 
conducting actions in order to bring it about.  
E. THE ENVIRONMENT OF COMPETITION 
Wei Qi is an ideal lens for processing the current environment of Great Power 
Competition with the PRC, as it helps to both simplify actions and helps illuminate 
understanding of the hybrid threat that exists. It is a recognized fact that China under 
President Xi is the rising power of the Twenty-First century, as it follows his plan of 
National Rejuvenation which includes continued modernization, economic and military 
growth and ever expanding global presence.9 This development has led to much writing 
on power transition theory in political science circles with the most prominent being 
Graham Allison’s Thucydides Trap and John Mearsheimer’s Tragedy of Great Power 
Politics.10 The trap is a situation when a rising power (China) threatens the status quo that 
benefits the incumbent power (the United States) as was observed by the Greek historian 
Thucydides between Athens and Sparta. According to the Allison, this competition has 
historically lead to conflict between the two powers in order to determine the new number 
one.11  
Much of power transition theory is dedicated to exploring how war can be avoided 
in the Sino–U.S. relations. Theorists tend to look at factors such as economic 
interdependence, nuclear deterrence, and multi-lateral organizations and each country’s 
 
9 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving The People’s 
Republic of China 2020, Annual Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: Pentagon, 2020), 
https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-
REPORT-FINAL.PDF. 
10 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Updated edition. (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 2014). 
11 Graham T. Allison, Destined for War : Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017). 
10 
participation in them. The threat of collapsing the world’s two biggest economies and the 
damage a full war between the two would do to the rest of the global economy is a relevant 
deterrent but one that can be overlooked if a party feels its security is at stake. Nuclear 
deterrence a defining feature of the Cold War that just meant that hot wars were either 
conducted via proxy or through a competition of influence.12 Of note, the PRC and the 
U.S. had come to blows in Korea and Vietnam during this time of nuclear deterrence. So 
excluding the possibility of a limited war is not entirely accurate. Furthermore, while the 
CCP may not want to shatter the international environment, it will use it to its advantage 
to protect their interests and perspective.13 This would make them reformers vice 
revolutionaries in the global commons. The power transition literature also explores how 
each side actively declares rejection of the trap and their individual preference for war 
avoidance. What the power transition theory does not fully explore is that, despite these 
limitations on total war , the real battle is within that nebulous grey zone. The grey zone 
being the area between war and peace, armed conflict and competition across the DIME. 
The current conflict is a competition for presence, influence and the ability to lead on the 
world stage. 
The hybrid nature of the conflict fits both the ideals and preferences of the CCP. 
The CCP’s core interests is the survival of the party, maintain sovereignty, and ensure 
economic and societal modernization, or as President Xi labels them National 
Rejuvenation.14 In order to achieve this rejuvenation the CCP must continue to expand its 
economy and help its companies grow their overseas presence so as to maintain the 30-
year trend of above-average economic growth. The CCP perceives that the U.S. wants to 
contain this expansion, and is willing to conduct a Whole-of-Government approach toward 
its growing position in the world. A revealing document from the CCP perspective is 
Unrestricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy America written by two PLAN 
 
12 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times, 
vol. 85 (Cambridge: Council on Foreign Relations, 2005), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511817991. 
13 D. Shambaugh, China and the World (Oxford University Press, 2020), https://books.google.com/
books?id=_tjBDwAAQBAJ. 
14 Nadège Rolland, “China’s Vision for a New World Order,” The National Bureau Of Asian 
Research, no. NBR Special Report #83 (January 2020): 68. 
11 
military strategist. Unrestricted Warfare argues for the use of what has been described as 
Lawfare, Economic Warfare, Cyber warfare and even the application of terrorism in a 
struggle against the United States.15 With the exception of terrorism, likely due to the U.S. 
War on Terror which occurred after the publication of this book, these methods have been 
prevalent in China’s behavior. Their island building in the South China Sea and maritime 
confrontations are all from taking certain positions and interpretations of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Even the CCP’s most recent move against Hong 
Kong and their use of a security law to enforce censorship of pro-democratic movements 
fall within the ideals of Lawfare. Their Economic Warfare is their most potent weapon, 
with their debt trap policies, and global infrastructure project the Belt and Road Initiative. 
Even the current trade war that China has with the U.S. and Australia can be seen as this 
method. Finally, a defining feature of recent U.S. – Sino relations has been the constant 
cyber intrusions by netizens who, operating under the aegis of the CCP, have been stealing 
DOD secrets, plans and civilian intellectual property.16  
Due to the global nature of this path toward rejuvenation, there is almost a sense 
that too much is going on and that the CCP is encircling the U.S. and its allies on all fronts. 
By viewing the CCP’s actions through a strategic lens of Wei Qi, one can not only help 
simplify the complex competing relationship with the U.S., but also understand the nuances 
of its relationship with different nations as it expands. A Wei Qi lens will help an observer 
understand how much investment the CCP is putting into a country, reflecting its potential 
importance but also understand how effective it is developing influence. A Wei Qi lens can 
help develop an observer’s ability to understand what benefits the CCP can develop via its 
involvement in distant countries and how best to limit this potential. Ultimately, a Wei Qi 
perspective can help an observer understand that the globalized world, combined with 
China’s hybrid approach toward expansion, inherently means that China can operate 
anywhere and will require a multifaceted approach to counter.  
 
15 Liang Qiao, Unrestricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy America (Panama City, 
Panama: Pan American Pub, 2002). 
16 Maurer, Tim., Cyber Mercenaries : The State, Hackers, and Power . (Cambridge, United 
Kingdom ;: Cambridge University Press, 2018). 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The use of Wei Qi as an analytical lens for CCP strategy is not a new idea, but 
there have been varying emphases on what is useful from the game and how it is applied. 
Some articles simply state that knowing Wei Qi is the same as knowing the CCP’s 
mindset and would be a map of their actions; others contend it has no use.17 While 
lessons can be learned from the game, it is a stretch to postulate that the PLA and CCP’s 
war plans and growth of global influence would be a centralized process dictated entirely 
by a game board. This chapter will review the leading analysis on how Wei Qi can be 
applied, examine the arguments against its use and finally, connect the game to the 
modern era of Great Power Competition and Power Transition Theory. 
A. WEI QI AND ITS APPLICATION TO CHINESE HISTORY AND 
STRATEGY 
One of the first to examine the usefulness and applicability of Wei Qi in 
understanding CCP actions and strategies was Scott Boorman, a mathematical 
sociologist from Yale. His 1969 book, The Protracted Game: A Wei-Ch’I Interpretation 
of Maoist Revolutionary Strategy linked Wei Qi stratagems to the Chinese Communist 
guerilla war from the 1920s to Communist victory and CCP establishment in 1949.18 
Boorman analyzed Mao’s guerrilla warfare tactics and strategies demonstrated that they 
adhered to the thousand-year-old strategies found in Wei Qi. Boorman’s analysis derived 
a 17-point model that displays Wei Qi’s relevance toward the insurgency of Mao.19 This 
model spreads across six major features of strategy: structural characteristics, how to 
develop patterns of force, strategic objectives, policies to develop territory, building up 
bases of support, and how to destroy hostile forces. Boorman postulates that this model 
helps develop the skills necessary to understand three axioms of CCP strategy and 
 
17 Michael Posner, “Weiqi: The Game That Holds China’s Key to World Domination,” The Globe and 
Mail, June 10, 2011, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/munk-debates/weiqi-the-game-that-holds-
chinas-key-to-world-domination/article598664/. 
18 Boorman, The Protracted Game. Wei Ch’I is a previous spelling and conversion of Chinese to 
English. The currently appropriate spelling is Wei Qi. 
19 Boorman, 154–60. 
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problem solving: the territory oriented concept of Maoist political-military doctrine, the 
pattern of political-military operations in space and time, and finally, the decisive 
character of connection and encirclement of forces.20 This is relevant for this thesis’s 
analysis of CCP expansion as it is not a simple military conquest instead, it is a 
combination of economic, informational and political dominance. While, the concepts 
of the three axioms still remain relevant in geopolitics, Boorman’s article has lost some 
of its explanatory power in the post-Mao era.  
Whereas Boorman connected Wei Qi to Maoist guerrilla warfare, David Lai 
connects Wei Qi to the oft-quoted military strategist Sun Tzu and the “Art of War.” 
David Lai’s 2004 monograph, Learning from the Stones: A Go Approach to Mastering 
China’s Strategic Concept, Shi is the central work shaping the modern discussion on 
Wei Qi and how it is a “living reflection of Chinese philosophy, culture, strategic 
thinking, warfare, military tactics, and diplomatic bargaining.”21 Go is the more popular 
Japanese name for Wei Qi, but the gameplay and concepts are the same for both games. 
Lai connects CCP strategy, Wei Qi and the “Art of War” through the concept of Shi, or 
the strategic configuration of power. Lai argues that understanding this strategic 
configuration of power requires a sophisticated assessment of the opponent in order to 
succeed in warfare. In Wei Qi, this concept is known as “reading” or deciphering your 
opponent’s strategy. Lai points out that Shi is so integral to historical Chinese military 
thought that Sun Tzu dedicated an entire chapter to breaking down the concept and its 
importance to success on the battlefield.22 Lai goes on to compare U.S. military 
capability and strategy to that of chess and its preponderance for overwhelming 
offensive force. This allows Lai to argue that CCP strategy is more influenced by the 
indirect and subtler methods that are seen in Wei Qi and proposed by Sun Tzu. Lai’s 
argument for learning from the stones rests on the understanding that in the modern 
world the U.S. is the global hegemon and direct military conflict is not the method by 
 
20 Boorman, 167. 
21 Lai, “Learning from the Stones.” 
22 Lai, 1–3. 
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which an adversary would challenge it. It is from a weaker position of power and the 
U.S. through unconventional methods that China would attempt to counter U.S. strength. 
Dr. Henry Kissinger agrees with David Lai’s position that there is an element of 
influence from Wei Qi upon the Chinese perspective of geopolitics. In his seminal book, 
On China Kissinger claims that Wei Qi is representative of Chinese Realpolitik and the 
teachings of Sun Tzu. According to Kissinger, Wei Qi develops the Chinese ideal of how 
to approach a political-military problem, “stresses subtlety, indirection, and the patient 
accumulation of relative advantage.”23 This ideal is reinforced by another long time 
U.S. China analyst Michael Pillsbury and his work The 100 Year Marathon. China’s 
Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower. Pillsbury’s book is based 
off his decades of experience in the U.S. government specializing on the CCP and their 
development from their revolution to the modern day.24 Pillsbury also states that Wei 
Qi is representative of the traits that are central to his thesis, that the CCP has a long 
term, reactive plan that is aimed at their single opponent, the United States. These traits 
being the ability to conducted multi-layered dynamic competition via methodical 
buildup of forces and capability, using deception and taking advantage of 
opportunities.25  
Supporting Lai’s approach is Zhongqi Pan from the School of International 
Relations and Public Affairs of Fudan University, who argues that Wei Qi is the game 
that best reflects the Chinese way of thinking. According to Pan’s article, Guanxi, Weiqi 
and Chinese Strategic Thinking the Chinese have a relational way of thinking and 
approaching problems and Wei Qi most accurately reflects this process.26 Pan, citing 
multiple psychological and sociological studies, proposes that Chinese perceptions are 
centered around the concept of Guanxi or that individual objects or subjects must exist 
23 Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin Press, 2011), 22–30. 
24 Michael Pillsbury, The 100 Year Marathon. China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the 
Global Superpower. (Hudson Institute, 2015). 
25 Pillsbury. 
26 Zhongqi Pan, “Guanxi, Weiqi and Chinese Strategic Thinking,” Chinese Political Science Review 
1, no. 2 (June 1, 2016): 303–21, https://doi.org/10.1007/s41111-016-0015-1. 
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within a context that is defined by their various relationships. Guanxi means that the 
Chinese tend to possess a holistic perception that defines things not by their sameness 
but by their relations to one another. Pan argues that this is drastically different from 
U.S. thinking which is more generic and follows categorization based off of similarity. 
To simplify, Zhonqi puts forward that the Chinese way of thinking is “the logic of 
relationships” compared to the American “logic of transactions.”27 This difference in 
logic therefore leads to different goals in the foreign policy realm, different views on 
the timeline it takes to achieve a desired effect and the principles of Wei Qi best reflect 
this thought process.  
B. CAN WEI QI BE A HEURISTIC MODEL?
With the understanding that Wei Qi and its concepts reflect aspects of Chinese
thought and perception, how does it fair as an applied model? According to Polish global 
politics researcher Mateusz Hudzikowski, Wei Qi fits perfectly within the Game Theory 
definition of a model to be used in international relations studies.28 Wei Qi fits the theory 
because it simplifies a complex relationship (international relations) with defined rules, 
but has enough dynamic variability to allow for the development of competing 
hypotheses and for studying the different results. Wei Qi as a model is useful as it 
stimulates strategic analysis. which is an inherent requirement in global politics. 
Specifically, Hudzikowski believes a Wei Qi model is best applied in conflict over space 
and territory, conflict simulation, negotiations, and resolution, as well as in conflicts of 
assets and interests.29 All of these describe the current global environment as China has 
expanded its presence and influence globally.  
There are those who argue against the use of a Wei Qi model, specifically Go 
master Richard Bozulich, the author of The Basics of Go Strategy. In Richard Bozulich 
on Kissinger on China and Go, a critique posted on the official U.S. Go organization 
website, Bozulich argues that the proposition of Wei Qi as analogous to CCP decision 
27 Pan. 
28 Hudzikowski, “The Go Game Model in International Politics Research.” 
29 Hudzikowski, 82–86. 
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making is too simple of a concept.30 Bozulich targets Kissinger’s assessment that Wei 
Qi is reflective of Chinese decision making and argues that success in Wei Qi are not 
equal and that success in one does not equal success in another. In that perspective, 
Bozulich is correct and all previous authors in this review would agree with him that it 
is not a perfect match. However, he misses the point that a Wei Qi model is a useful 
framework for simplifying a complex problem in line with Game Theory and in helping 
develop strategic perspective. Bozulich may be unaware of a truth within the military 
that simple analogies and frameworks help in the development of plans and in personnel 
training. While the concepts and game play may not be perfectly equal to actions in the 
real world, the understanding of a grander strategic picture is what is most desired from 
its application. 
C. HOW DOES WEI QI REFLECT GREAT POWER COMPETITION?
The 2018 National Defense Strategy announced that the United States
“acknowledges an increasingly complex global security environment, characterized by 
overt challenges to the free and open international order and the re-emergence of long-
term, strategic competition between nations” or great power competition.31 It 
specifically names China as a “strategic competitor…whose leveraging military 
modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce neighboring 
countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to their advantage” and the preeminent 
security challenge for the US.32 This position was reinforced with the annual report to 
Congress, the Military and Security Development Involving the PRC 2020, which looked 
at the past twenty-year development of the People’s Liberation Army and how it has 
strategically developed key areas of shipbuilding, land based conventional ballistic and 
cruise missiles, and integrated air defense systems.33 The report also states that in 
30 Bozulich, Richard., “Richard Bozulich on Kissinger on China and Go,” 2011, 
https://www.usgo.org/files/bh_library/BozulichonKissinger.pdf. 
31 Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (Washington, D.C.: 
Pentagon, 2018), 1–3, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-
Summary.pdf. 
32 Department of Defense, 3. 
33 Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2020 PRC Report. 
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pursuit of its “National Rejuvenation” the CCP will take a Military-Civil Fusion 
development strategy combining its economic efforts via the Belt and Road Initiative 
with its security strategies. Security strategies that are now supported by the world 
largest navy of 350 ships and submarines and have a strategic direction to be a “world 
class” military able to project power globally.34  
This expansion of scope beyond China’s traditional region of power toward a 
global goal supports the perspective of a Wei Qi model, as the board represents the 
world. This global perspective will force the players to develop their different bases or 
regions of strength to achieve their goals, national rejuvenation or maintenance of the 
status quo. 
This recognition of China’s growing military capability and power combined 
with their continued economic growth has caused much discussion on the nature of 
China’s rise and whether the PRC will challenge the United States for hegemonic 
position. The study of this tension falls within Power Transition Theory. The theory 
looks at ways that a rising power can overtake and replace a declining hegemonic one 
and whether it can be peaceful or will always result in violent conflict. Graham Allison 
has labeled this phenomenon as the “Thucydides Trap”: a pattern in which the two 
powers are destined to conflict as the rising power challenges the status quo that benefits 
the declining hegemon.35 Of the 15 transitions through history that Allison studied, 11 
resulted in war; however, this effort was focused on European power transitions and, as 
David Kang and Xinru Ma point out Thucydides Didn’t Live in East Asia.36 Kang and 
Ma surmise while the trap is logical, there is a historical record within East Asia of a 
different type of power transition. Analyzing the transitions at the end of the Ming 
Dynasty (1600), the Imjin War (1592-1598) and the Ming-Qing Transition (1644-1683) 
promotes a couple of lessons. First, conflict comes from a power vacuum and not a 
 
34 Office of the Secretary of Defense. 
35 Allison, Destined for War. 
36 David C. Kang and Xinru Ma, “Power Transitions: Thucydides Didn’t Live in East Asia,” The 
Washington Quarterly 41, no. 1 (January 2, 2018): 137–54, https://doi.org/10.1080/
0163660X.2018.1445905. 
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transition. Second, that prestige and interest play a bigger role in decision making 
compared to Balance of Power theory and the need to bandwagon or balance.37 Kang 
and Ma also postulate that within the region, China has already transitioned to the role 
of regional hegemon, but via economic means vice traditional military conquest.  
This difference on the inevitability of conflict is also reflected in the Clash of 
Titans series between Realist John Mearshimer and career diplomat Zbigniew 
Brzezinski.38 The two argue over the nature of China’s rise, with Mearshimer arguing 
for his Offensive Realism and the inevitability of regional efforts to contain China 
increasing the chance for conflict.39 Brzezinski argues that there are structural 
differences in the modern world, specifically nuclear deterrence that prevent this 
conflict. He also postulates that China’s actions are motivated by and focused on 
economic and domestic forces, which benefit from the current international system and 
status quo.40 These differences in voices on the nature of China’s rise, what are its 
driving forces and what the desired end state Sino - U.S. relationship may be support the 
use of a Wei Qi model that simplifies the interactions of global expansion and presence.  
D. LITERATURE GAPS 
The current literature on Wei Qi and its benefits toward developing 
understanding of CCP strategy has historically been limited toward the PRC’s domestic 
and regional conflicts. The concepts and models were written before the CCP started 
conducting aggressive actions in the South China Sea, developed its BRI, created the 
AIIB and achieved the PRC’s economic status as the second largest economy in the 
world. The next step in the conversation is to use the Wei Qi model to understand CCP 
intentions as it expands globally, but to also see how effective its different approaches 
 
37 Kang and Ma, 143–45. 
38 Zbigniew Brzezinski and John Mearshimer, “Clash of the Titans,” Foreign Policy 146 (February 
2005): 45–50. Surely the book here is The Tragedy of Great Power Politics? I would throw in Paul 
Kennedy for good measure as well.  
39 John J Mearsheimer, “Can China Rise Peacefully?,” in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 2014, 
56, http://www.eastlaw.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Can-China-Rise-Peacefully_-_-The-National-
Interest.pdf. 
40 Zbigniew Brzezinski and John Mearshimer, “Clash of the Titans.” 
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are in support of its grand strategy. This application will address a gap that helps analyze 
CCP strategy not through a lens of fear— as attributed to the Thucydides Trap—but 
through clarity by focusing on Chinese interests.  
E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis will apply a model or series of questions derived from the gameplay 
and strategy of Wei Qi to two countries: Australia and Djibouti. This application is 
similar to Admiral McRaven’s process in his work Special Ops: Case Studies in Special 
Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice and instead of identifying the level of 
“Relative Superiority” achieved in an operation I will be examining the level of 
influence the CCP has in both countries. The benefit of choosing these two nations as 
case studies is that they provide different perspectives on Chinese international 
interactions, geography and remove any issues of core interests or sovereignty from the 
discussion. These two nations also provide a useful understanding of the larger scope of 
Chinese activity and the global nature of how the strategic competition is evolving. The 
two cases allow for a clear perspective on CCP global power projection, what methods 
of influence it uses in different regions and how effective it is at the task.  
The questions to be used are derived from the gameplay of Wei Qi but also from 
work conducted by David Lai and his examination of Sun Tzu and the concept of Shi 
and its relations to the game.41 The questions are designed to examine the environment 
that the players are competing in, while narrowing down which options are available to 
the adversary. Examining the environment and the liberties available help in deciding 
how a player can react in order to limit the opponent. The Wei Qi model is displayed in 




41 Lai, “Learning from the Stones.” 
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Table 1. Wei Qi Model 
Where is the case study on the board? In the Game? 
What is the amount of and use of Zheng and Qi in the area? 
Are these forces becoming overwhelming with irresistible power across all 
aspects of DIME? 
Are these forces developing a favorable situation with great potential to achieve 
political objectives? 
Is China taking and maintaining the initiative; is there a void to fill? 
Is the relationship between China and the country a Ko? 
Are these forces becoming overwhelming with irresistible power across all 
aspects of DIME? 
 
These questions should be able to develop a sense of understanding of the available 
options to the players, or “reading,” as it is known in Wei Qi circles. Each of the questions 
focuses on the nature of the interests involved and what actions are being conducted.  
F. SOURCES 
Answers to these questions will be derived from multiple sources in order to 
develop the clearest understanding on the relationships between the PRC and each country. 
The thesis uses news articles covering economic and political developments, government 
statements and reports from each case study country, the United States and the PRC. Use 
multi-lateral trade organization data, United Nations information and previous polls and 
studies on perceptions of Chinese expansion in each country.  
G. BREAKING DOWN THE WEI QI MODEL 
The first question, “Where are we on the board? In the Game?” is used to help the 
player focus. on the region of the game board or the terrain. In the case studies, this will be 
the geography of the nation as well as understanding the interests of the opponent. Breaking 
down how far the nation is from mainland China and its main sphere of influence in East 
Asia provides scale and focus on the interests involved. Understanding the terrain will help 
examine what the lines of communication are between the two nations and how that effects 
the timing and pressure of their relationship. Understanding where the nation is in the game 
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helps understand the limiting factors but also is related to the timeline of the game. In Wei 
Qi, playing along the walls typically occurs in the early to middle part of the game and as 
the game ends focus shifts toward the center. This also correlates to the amount of stones 
or moves left in order to claim territory. Hence, the importance of this question is to 
understand the limiting factors of material and potentially the importance of the 
relationship.  
The second question, “What is the amount of and use of Zheng and Qi in the area?” 
is understanding what methods of influence and power China is applying to the case study. 
Zheng as defined by Lai is the regular way of doing things, or in military terms, the regular 
order of battle.42 Qi is the mobilization or extraordinary use of these forces in order to 
achieve the desired effect. For the purposes of this study, we will examine Zheng as the 
application of all instruments of national power and their legal use and Qi will be the 
abnormal use of these tools. Abnormal usage would be in line with the concepts of Hybrid 
Warfare and Chinese Unrestricted Warfare, as it looks at all aspects of a government’s 
actions across DIME.  
The third question, “Are these forces becoming overwhelming with irresistible 
power across all aspects of DIME?” will look at the effectiveness of these tools. A mixture 
of government statements, news articles and previous studies it will be used to examine 
which methods are being applied most effectively and if they are balanced across the DIME 
spectrum. This question also allows the player to observe the amount of effort its opponent 
is applying and predict what areas it may attempt to expand upon.  
The fourth question, “Are these forces developing a favorable situation with great 
potential to achieve political objective?” is closely tied to the previous question. This 
question will examine if the effort described above is allowing the opponent to develop the 
target country into their exclusive territory or if there is still room for the player to make 




The fifth question is a two parts, “Is China taking and maintaining the initiative? Is 
there a void to fill?” is designed for the player to be introspective on its moves. By asking 
if the CCP is filling a void, the player must examine its own framework, gameplay and 
influence in the case study. This introspection allows the player to understand better their 
impact on the case study, but also characterizes if there is space for it to make a move. 
Understanding if it has a framework to build upon or if it must start playing catchup will 
help the player determine how much effort is required to limit the CCP’s influence. This 
understanding will also help evaluate if those resources are not better used elsewhere in 
order to gain an advantage in a different part of the board. This understanding is a key 
lesson from Wei Qi, in that containment of the opponent’s territory doesn’t require playing 
in every position, but in limiting their overall ownership of the board.  
The sixth question, “Is the relationship between China and the country a Ko?” is a 
main feature of Wei Qi and helps set the stage for the biggest battles between the two sides. 
As previously discussed, a Ko is of such importance that its loss could mean the collapse 
of significant territory or threaten the core interests. The best analogy for a Ko in the real 
world is the issue of Taiwan and the concept of sovereignty. As with Taiwan, in a Ko, it is 
a life or death situation. The taking of it is central to one players entire side and it is up to 
each side to determine how much loss could be sustained in order to win. In a game this 
could mean multiple stones and in the world this could mean kinetic warfare, the loss of 
thousands of lives and the disruption of the world’s two most impactful economies.  
The seventh and final question is made up of three parts, “What is the Framework 
that the forces are providing? What strategy is being used? What liberties do the pieces 
provide?” are questions that should be asked for every move but is also important to 
understand what winning a case study provides. Examination of the framework that is 
being laid out by the opponent is a constant to understanding its strategies and to develop 
the counter strategies to win. This examination of the framework should not be myopic 
toward the region on the board, but how gaining of this territory leads to larger encirclement 
and ultimately victory in the game. For the case studies, this will be an examination of 
those nations as they impact the immediate region of their influence but also what role they 
can play on a global scale.  
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In addition to the model being applied, each case study will get a history of the 
relationship these two nations shared prior to the current time frame of President Xi. This 
brief history of the relationship will set the base lines for the model as well as help show 
the recent changes in their individual dynamics. Combining the history and the model will 
help a player understand the environment they are playing in and help them best decide on 
how to win the board.  
H. THE GAME BOARD IMAGINED 
Figure 4 was created to represent how different regions and nations could be 
imagined on the game board. To start, geographic location is not completely replicated, as 
the positions on the board are not just physical, but are represented to indicate the level of 
influence and impact each provides. As such, in the two corners are the United States and 
the People’s Republic of China because they are the strongholds of each player. Other 
potential corners, are Africa and South America as they are significant large continents 
made up of multiple countries that can be isolated and turned into separate smaller 
strongholds. For the purposes of this analysis, the Mediterranean Sea is the center, as it 
connects multiple regions and is where the BRI terminates. The map’s free floating 
geography is beneficial as some regions, such as Central Asia, are more transitional or can 
be considered corridors to territory “owned” by each player. This representation also 
reflects modern political realities, such as having Europe be close to the U.S. corner as the 
relationship between the two is extremely stable. This same logic is why Southeast Asia 
and Central Asia are relatively closer to the PRC, as this recognizes the regional hegemonic 
relationship there. The more dynamic and independent regions like the Middle East and 
nations like India are in different locations, either along the “walls” or toward the “center” 
depending on their level of impact on the greater game. This thesis will provide a 
representation for each case study to help the reader imagine the relationships and locations 
of the nation under discussion.  
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Figure 4. Baseline Game Board Representation 
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III. AUSTRALIA AND THE WALL  
Australia is a unique country in many ways from its geography, topography, 
biology and its ability to project both globally and regionally. It is at the same time the 
world’s sixth largest country and its smallest continent spanning 7.7 million square 
kilometers or slightly smaller than the contiguous United States. This large landmass is 
populated with just 25 million people mostly along the more livable edges concentrated in 
the East, Southeast and Western portions.43 This population distribution is due to a mixture 
of its defining geographical feature the arid, harsh Outback in its center but also due to its 
colonial and maritime heritage. Besides its defining topography and unique wildlife 
another feature is the remoteness of the country with the distance from Canberra to Beijing 
being 9004 kilometers as the crow flies. But surprisingly, the distance from Canberra to 
Honolulu, is 600 kilometers closer at 8,408. One would imagine that this distance would 
make it isolated from world events and possibly a relatively quiet player in regional and 
global events. This however is not the case as Australia is a high-income country, the 8th 
richest economy with a GDP per capita of $57,395 thanks to a strong service sector and 
abundant natural resources.44 Australia is an active member of many global multilateral 
efforts such as the UN, G20, IMF, WTO and WHO. It is also involved regionally as a 
founding member of APEC and East Asia Summits, and have been in the ASEAN Plus 
talks, CPTTP and RCEP. Due to Australia’s unique place on the globe and its activism in 
the region, the Wei Qi model should be applied to Australia to help understand not only 
why China is invested there but also how China’s behavior is affecting its ability to exert 
influence.  
 
43 Central Intelligence Agency, “Australia - Oceania :: Australia — The World Factbook - Central 
Intelligence Agency,” CIA World Factbook, September 20, 2020, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/geos/as.html. 
44 Harvard Growth Lab, “The Atlas of Economic Complexity,” Academic, The Atlas of Economic 




A. APPLYING THE WEI QI MODEL 
1. Where Is the Case Study On the Board? In the Game? 
Australia’s position is along the wall of the board game, Figure 5, because of its 
ability to provide liberties not only toward the corners but also toward the center of the 
board. Australia on the board is once again unique because of its geography and relatively 
equidistance from the two players. Both players have significant influence, agreements and 
relationships with the country, economics being stronger for China and information/ 
culture, diplomacy and security for the United States. Despite it appearing that Australia 
has more ties along the DIME spectrum with the United States, China’s economic leverage 
evens the playing field. The distance, however, still makes it hard for any one country to 
claim it as strong corner for itself, without a significant shift in Chinese-Australian relations 
or an uptick of U.S.–Australian trade goods. Australia can be considered along the wall, 
because of its power projection potential into the Pacific, South China Sea, and the Indian 
Ocean. This is relevant as the Indian Ocean and the Middle East are the next geographic 
areas before the center of the board, the Mediterranean and Australia’s ability to hamper 
the Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC’s) there threaten greater Chinese expansion.  
Where we are in the game is another crucial part in understanding what is next 
possible for China. Positioning along the wall tends to occur in the middle portion of the 
game, where a player still has hundreds of moves available. This means that China can still 
push for more territory and influence in this area, especially if it is vital to expanding areas, 
but also if aggressive actions limit the moves and responses of the opponent (U.S.). This 
also means that while Australia may be important, there are other grander goals in which 
the target country could either help or hinder a player’s strategy further down the line. This 
may put a limitation on how aggressive the CCP may behave toward Australia, but it also 
means that there is room for China to flex in order to create space and maintain influence.  
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Figure 5. Australian Representation on the Game Board  
2. What Is the Amount of and Use of Zheng and Qi in the Area? 
a. Zheng and the Australia-China Relationship 
When considering the normal forces of influence or, Zheng, that are being used by 
China toward Australia, once again distance is relevant to understanding the problem. Even 
with China’s unlawful expansion into the South China Seas, their military patrols, blue 
water task groups and even their expanded Anti-Access/Area-Denial capabilities do not 
approach Australian territory. Australia also has a sense of security due to its signing of the 
Australia, New Zealand, and the United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) in 1951. ANZUS 
provides Australia with insulation from Chinese military expansion, or at least fear of any 
imminent threats to its sovereignty; instead, Australia views the PRC as a threat to regional 
stability.45 Australia has participated in every war that the United States has been a part of 
since World War II. This participation includes two conflicts where China was unofficially 
 
45 Rory Medcalf, “Australia And China: Understanding the Reality Check,” Australian Journal of 
International Affairs 73, no. 2 (March 4, 2019): 109–18, https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2018.1538315. 
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involved, the Korean War and the Vietnam War. While there has never been any 
confirmation of direct conflict between Australian and Chinese troops, they have been on 
opposite sides of a kinetic war. In a sign of solidarity with the United States after the P-3 
incident in 2001, Australia sailed three frigates through the Taiwan Strait without prior 
warning to China.46 This act that showed that Australia was not afraid to project presence 
and power north toward China and that when it comes to security, it would side with the 
United States. 
Strategically, Australia’s military alliance with the United States is a disadvantage 
for China in that Australia is the unsinkable aircraft carrier that would help the United 
States in a war in the Pacific. This isn’t hyperbole, as it is one of the main lessons from 
World War II and was key to the Allies’ campaign against Imperial Japan. It was 
Australia that provided the safe location from which to project the island hopping 
campaign that lead to the rolling back of Japanese forces to the main islands. The modern 
equivalent is United States’ AirSea Battle concept. As Benjamin Scheer of the 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) points out, Australia is key to this:  
Some have pointed out that AirSea Battle depends on U.S. allies for its 
implementation and so should be seen as a joint allied operational plan. 
Specifically, Australia can provide ideal strategic depth and safe havens for 
U.S. military deployments, logistic support, communication and control 
nodes, and an ideal outpost—and launch pad—to project U.S. power into 
the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea while remaining secure, beyond 
the reach of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles.47 
Another major signal to China of Australia’s military position was the Australian 
Government’s 2009 Defence White Paper Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: 
Force 2030, which allotted funds for an investment of defensive capabilities and growth in 
regional partnerships against a potential Chinese threat. The paper, written in light of the 
2008 global financial crisis, saw a diminishing United States and militarily expanding 
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47 Benjamin Schreer, Planning the Unthinkable War: “airsea Battle” and Its Implications for 
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China forcing the authors to consider all possible threats. With its security guarantor 
falling, Australia looked to see what threats it potentially would have to independently deal 
with as the center of gravity of the world shifted toward Asia. The papers key finding on 
ways that Australia could threaten China is as follows: 
Over the years, Canberra’s defence policy has gradually shifted from 
wholesale dependence on U.S. military protection to the development of its 
own capacities. The 2009 Defence White Paper’s ambitious procurement 
programs were an indication of the shift. Enhanced capabilities for the 
Royal Australian Navy can potentially pose serious threats to Chinese 
interests in three areas. One is its submarine force, which can assist in U.S. 
efforts to impose a blockade of the Strait of Malacca, China’s maritime 
lifeline; another is the Australian Navy’s antisubmarine capability, which 
can threaten China’s nuclear-powered and conventional submarines; a third 
is its networks of naval facilities that can be used by U.S. forces for naval 
operations.48 
While attempting to plan against a potential threat from China in 2030 the paper, 
also hoped to temper Chinese responses by saying that the threat was unlikely and that its 
plan was mostly focused on providing capabilities to maintain regional stability. Chinese 
officials and scholars denounced this, calling it fearmongering and Australia’s attempt to 
become a regional hegemon.49 The 2013 Defence White Paper followed this up with 
clearer language, specifically stating that the United States and China were stabilizing the 
region and didn’t appear to be on the path toward war, but Australia was still going to 
develop the desired capabilities.50 
Australia’s military action outside of its ANZUS alliance is as a regional collective 
security builder. Australia has increased its defense cooperation and partnerships with its 
neighbors and others throughout the region in hopes of maintaining a regional peace.51 For 
China, this adds another military trip wire, as those who have bilateral defense agreements 
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with Australia include Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, India and Japan.52 While 
not all of these countries have territorial disputes with China, the majority do and all have 
their own bilateral tensions. This loose network of regional security centered on Australia 
presents China a problem, as it could be a framework for balancing in the region and a 
coordinated defense effort along the Sea Lines of Communications from East Asia all the 
way to the Middle East.  
Currently, the main force of national power that China uses against Australia is 
economic, followed by diplomatic pressures and then informational or cultural. Since 
normalization of relations between the PRC and the Australian government in 1972, PRC 
and Australian economic relations have shifted from mutual benefit to economic 
interdependence.53 The CCP’s multi-decade campaign to grow the PRC’s industrial 
capability, expands its urban centers and become the world’s economic engine directly 
benefitted Australia, as it was one of the core suppliers of natural resources. Since 2007, 
China has been Australia’s single biggest trading partner, which was responsible for 
Australia’s economic growth and continued rising living standards.54  
For more context, Australia’s total 2017 exports were worth U.S. $227 billion; 
33.55% of it went to China, compared to only 3.6% to the United States. This economic 
differential is also observed when comparing imports to Australia, in which China was 
19.54% of the U.S. $210 billion and the United States was only at 11.63%.55 Both countries 
share free trade agreements with Australia, China-Australia Free Trade Agreement 
(ChAFTA) and the Australia-United States FTA (AUSFTA); however, it is ChAFTA that 
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produces more trade and economic growth for Australia.56 According to the Australian 
government, AUSFTA has more Foreign Direct Investment in stocks and is the mechanism 
for most of Australia’s investment in foreign nations.57  
China has been Australia’s biggest trading partner since 2007.58 Australia is not 
China’s biggest trading partner, or even one with a favorable trade balance, with Australia 
buying 2% of Chinese exports, worth U.S. $44 billion. Comparatively, imports of 
Australian products to China is more than twice that at 5% or U.S. $108 billion worth of 
the total imports annually.59 Australia is one of the few nations to have a favorable trade 
surplus with China, as it is a core supplier of natural resources of iron, coal, natural gas and 
food. Further creating a comparative advantage for Australia is that Chinese steel mills are 
configured to use the specific type of iron that is found in Australia.60 President Xi in 2014 
described ChAFTA as a Comprehensive Partnership, signaling the importance the 
relationship holds in China.61 
While the above describes economic enticement, similar to the soft power 
principles described by Joseph Nye, the CCP also uses economics as a lever of coercion.62 
China recently has used a mixture of economic demand calibration, anti-dumping 
investigations and trade embargoes to affect the Australian agricultural sector in response 
to diplomatic issues. Specially, the Chinese actions followed calls for an investigation into 
the origins and spread of COVID-19 by the Australian government. China has enacted 
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trade embargoes on Australian barley with tariffs at 80.5%, effectively stopping a billion-
dollar industry.63 This method of trade embargo is also being targeted at Australian beef 
and wine industries, which are worth three billion dollars, causing a panic within Australian 
farming and winery communities. This aggressive use of embargoes and investigations, 
while successfully causing a panic within Australia industry, has not achieved the 
concessions from the government that China desired.  
b. Qi and China’s Use of Unusual Methods in Australia 
The limits on military and economic expressions of power mean that qi, or unusual 
and creative use of forces, by China is focused on using informational and diplomatic levers 
of power against Australia. This is directly out of hybrid warfare doctrine and the use of 
non-military means of national power in order to compel or achieve a desired political 
effect. Examples of these non-standard actions include the use of Chinese students as a tool 
of agitation and financial hostages against Australian institutions. The CCP’s use of the 
ethnic Chinese population within Australia for creating deceptive narratives and undermine 
the Australian government’s authority. Finally, China’s aggressive regional behavior has 
led to diplomatic actions to include subversion of Australia’s political system. 
The biggest lever of informational/ cultural friction within Australia is the Chinese 
students attending university. As of 2019, Australia had 200,000 Chinese students 
attending their universities representing 25% of its student population.64 This high 
attendance is beneficial for both countries, as it expands the intellectual capital of China 
and is a $6-billion-dollar revenue source for Australia. However, this valuable population 
has recently become a lever of coercion in the Sino-Australian relationship blending 
cultural, diplomatic and economic influence. Culturally, the population was seen as a way 
to expand person-to-person relationships between China and Australia. To further this 
cultural exchange, Confucius Centers, a CCP sponsored and directed cultural outreach 
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program, were established at all universities. According to Li Mei’s study, Intended and 
Received Frames of China and the Expectation of Media showed, the effectiveness of the 
Confucius Centers and the CCP’s cultural exchange strategy has been limited.65 The 
limitation is in the depth of culture that is presented at the centers, which tend to have 
demonstrations of music, art and food, but do not delve into the debates that occur within 
Chinese society.  
This limitation is related to another aspect of the Chinese student population, and 
that is the self-censorship of ideas and free speech instilled in the population.66 This self-
censorship derives from the CCP incentivizing students to report each other for speaking 
against the government, which then threatens jail time for the offenders and their families. 
This behavior by the students and CCP diminishes the soft power appeal the Chinese 
system has with Australia, whose beliefs in freedom of speech and thought are central, 
especially in an academic environment. Australians respect or at least expect divergent 
views from the media and academia and a certain level of transparency. This behavior 
diminishes the appeal of the student’s presence, as there have been financial threats 
compelling university administrations to censor the professors.67 Australians view Chinese 
media and overseas efforts to bridge cultural gaps as mere propaganda. This perception is 
supported by actions such as President Xi Jinping’s 2014 visit in Sydney to finalize 
ChAFTA and raise it to the level of a comprehensive partnership. Reportedly, the 
thousands of people waving PRC and Australian flag upon his arrival were bused in by the 
embassy in order to give the appearance of popular investment in the agreement and the 
prevalence of Chinese influence.68 Combine a propaganda campaign with the recent 
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diplomatic disputes and manipulative use of the students, and it is easy to see why China’s 
soft power appeal is rapidly diminishing in Australia.  
In the past few years there has been a downward trend in the bi-lateral relationship 
that can be traced back to two diplomatic issues: China’s aggressive actions in the South 
China Sea and Chinese interference in Australian domestic politics. These two points have 
been catalysts for Australia’s strong responses to Chinese regional behavior, their security 
influenced economic policies and a shift in the perception of the inherent dangers of the bi-
lateral relationship. What has followed these events are a series of political confrontations 
ranging, from the PRC detainment of Australian journalist and researchers, to the 
establishment of new laws specifically targeting Chinese interests.   
China’s island building in the South China Sea and aggressive maritime actions 
shifted the perception within Australian diplomatic circles of the nature of the threat posed 
by China.69 Chinese assertiveness, coercion and military modernization were threatening 
the regional balance and rules-based order. China was extending its military capabilities 
and influence closer to Australia proper and its surrounding areas: into the Indian Ocean, 
the South Pacific and throughout Southeast Asia. These actions stimulated a sense of 
wariness and discussion within Australian national security circles, which weighed the 
potential security threat against the economic repercussions of Australian dissent. This 
balance between security and economic prosperity checked Australian responses toward 
Chinese aggression. Despite Australian misgivings of Chinese behavior, Australia 
maintained neutrality on Chinese international claims.  
This caution however, was eroded by the revelation of Chinese interference in the 
Australian political system. Investigative journalists and Australian intelligence revealed 
that Chinese entities and pro-China Australian billionaires were actively funding political 
campaigns in order to achieve political favor.70 The Chinese funding of Senator Sam 
Dastyari’s campaign revealed a worrying dimension of his support for China’s South China 
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Sea claims. These activities were in direct violation of the Australia – China 1972 Joint 
Communique of mutual respect and noninterference of internal affairs, undermining the 
trust in the relationship. The violation of these fundamental interactions led to a new law, 
the National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Act 
2018,71 which restricted political funding by foreign interests but also established 
requirements for more transparency to observe the net of influence that China was casting. 
This distrust has stopped Australia from signing a Memorandum of Understanding for 
China’s One Belt and One Road Initiative and impose restrictions on individual states 
signing contracts with Chinese state owned enterprises (SOE), all in order to prevent undue 
influence by a foreign entity.72  
3. Are These Forces Becoming Overwhelming with Irresistible Power 
Across All Aspects of DIME? 
In the globalized modern world, the PRC’s economic power can appear to be an 
overwhelming force. However, market forces can always help when a bilateral relationship 
sours. As the PRC continues disruptive regional behavior, or as the downward spiral of 
bilateral relations continues, Australia has the option to shift its exports to other areas. This 
could include increasing US-AUS trade or focusing on other regional nations that are 
growing and replacing China as the world’s factory, such as Indonesia, Malaysia and India. 
Australia has good relations in economics and security with all of these nations. With the 
bulk of Chinese – Australian trade being within iron ore, tourism and education, Australia 
has options to diversify and shift its focus.  
China is not achieving an overwhelming force in informational or diplomatic 
means, either. It is in fact creating resistance within Australia, as seen in the 2018 law put 
in place over foreign influence, interference and espionage, which seeks to stop covert, 
coercive or corrupting behavior. CCP’s continued aggressive action within Australia may 
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continue to shift the perception of the public, leading them to view China as a serious 
security threat. 
The CCP’s actions are altering the perception of Australia while simultaneously 
creating issues domestically. Australian merchants are looking at other Asian markets in 
order to make up for the loss of demand, increasing the available stock to countries like 
Japan, whose demand was already higher for beef than China’s.73 Domestically, 
embargoes on food imports, in combination with natural disasters within China such as 
recent flood damage to farmland are increasing food prices. This lack of food security, 
combined with President Xi’s Clean Plate Policy, a food waste limiting legislation, on a 
population where beef consumption in China is projected to rise 236% between 2009 and 
2050, could signal that the CCP’s international behavior is negatively affecting the Chinese 
population.74 This combination opens the door to criticism of the party and the CCP’s 
worse fear: a questioning of the party’s legitimacy.  
Australia’s ability to shift its supply to other parts of Asia and globally is a 
byproduct of another area of the Chinese – Australian economic relationship and that is 
within multinational trade organizations. More specifically within the Mega Regional 
Trade Agreements (MRTA) that are changing the financial landscape of the Asian Pacific 
region and will determine China’s economic and leadership future. Australia’s roles in 
these relationships is as a vocal proponent and enforcer of the international norms and 
challenger to PRC domination of these organizations. Australia is a member of both the 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), and 
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). CPTPP is a free trade 
agreement that will cover 13.5% of global GDP and 14% of global population and projects 
a growth of U.S. $157 billion per year by 2030, but China is not a participant. RCEP is a 
free trade agreement but one in which China is an active participant, which will cover 24% 
of the global GDP and 46% of the global population and with a projected increase in global 
income by U.S. $286 billion per year by 2030. RCEP will be the largest trading bloc in the 
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world, leading to Chinese economic growth by 0.4%, whereas CPTPP is projected to 
reduce China’s GDP by 0.3%.75 China does not participate in CPTPP because its original 
form, the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), was as an MRTA designed to counter China. 
However, the CPTPP is relevant as its regulations for a system like China’s require rapid 
liberalization and economic reforms, and undermine Chinese SOEs. Australia is a leading 
member of both MRTAs and it has the desire to bring into RCEP, CPTPP provisions, such 
as 100% liberalization of trade, that would undermine China’s growth and power within 
RCEP. China would like to prevent Australia from bringing these provisions into RCEP 
but is finding it difficult to change their liberal mindset and undermine their ability to build 
coalitions.  
4. Are These Forces Developing a Favorable Situation with Great 
Potential to Achieve Political Objective? 
China is not developing a favorable situation within Australia; they are pushing 
Australia on central ideals of their government and political system, forcing them to 
respond with balancing behavior. This balancing can be seen in their active voicing of 
protest and accountability in multiple international forums, including UNCLOS and World 
Health Organization. Australia is also developing and enhancing its regional bilateral 
security relations beyond just the United States, to include having defense pacts with all of 
its neighbors.76 China is failing to develop soft power via its Confucius Centers and its use 
of student protests. It is creating tensions not only at senior government levels but also for 
the 1.2 million ethnic Chinese Australians.77 The CCP’s aggressive actions are potentially 
turning Australia into a U.S. corner or having stronger ownership of the wall.  
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5. Is China Taking and Maintaining the Initiative? Is There a Void to Fill? 
The CCP’s actions are not taking an initiative but appear to be in response to 
Australia’s resolve and actions on the international stage. China may have perceived that 
there was a void after the U.S. pulled out the Transpacific Partnership and the Kyoto 
accords, and started an America First approach under the Trump administration. But the 
PRC did not account for Australia’s individual resolve and a strong identity and willingness 
to assert their own interest.  
6. Is the Relationship Between China and the Country a Ko? 
It is unclear whether the relationship between Australia and China is a Ko. Australia 
may be a significant middle power capable of exerting power greater than their population 
and economic size (per Chinese estimates78) but in relative power compared to China is 
far outmatched. Population is one example of this disparity: one Chinese city, such as its 
wealthiest, Shanghai, has the same number of people as the entirety of Australia and nearly 
the same GDP.79 The CCP’s recent aggressive behavior toward Australia may be an 
indication that they are willing to lose a strong position within Australia, and choose to 
deal with them on regional matters instead.  
7. What Is the Framework That the Forces Are Providing? What Strategy 
Is Being Used? What Liberties Do the Pieces Provide? 
Chinese influence within Australia has always been restricted to economic ties and 
attempting to develop soft power influence. Some Australian analysts theorize the CCP is 
using this method to try to separate Australia from its close relationship with the United 
States.80 In Wei Qi terms, this was an attempt to thicken their position along the wall by 
gaining some control, but mostly by limiting U.S. advancement. However, the cultural and 
security ties that Australia and the United States share has been reinforced by China’s 
aggressive behavior and make Australia more securely within U.S. controlled territory or 
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influence. The hybrid, informational and diplomatically focused attempt to stimulate the 
Chinese diaspora against Australia and use economic incentives has not contained the 
liberal ideas of the Australian state.  
B. CONCLUSION: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
Due to the negative effects Chinese behavior has had on the Sino-Australian 
relationship, the recommendation for the U.S. when it comes to Australia is to maintain the 
relationship and be a better partner than the PRC. This is an easy task to do in the security 
and cultural realm, however, diplomatically the U.S. should adopt a more supportive role 
and reassure its ally of its commitments to global and regional stability. Economically, 
while Australia’s economy is strong and does not require an investment on a scale of the 
Marshall Plan, the U.S. should be aware that if Australia requires a significant shift in its 
trade relationship with China, it should be prepared to use the international market to ensure 
Australia’s economic survivability.  
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IV. DJIBOUTI: THE GATEWAY TO THE CENTER 
Djibouti is a small nation. At 23,200 square kilometers, it is slightly smaller than 
the state of New Jersey, with a population of less than a million people, a GDP of $1.8 
billion and no natural resources. What Djibouti possesses is a natural deep water port that 
is strategically located on the Horn of Africa with access to the Gulf of Aden and the Bab 
al-Mandeb, which is considered the fourth most important chokepoint in the world.81 This 
geo-strategic port and location is the main commodity of the nation, which leases land for 
foreign nations to develop military bases. This allows Djibouti to develop a synergistic 
effect of increasing cash flow and provision of security by powerful nations in a dynamic 
region. Camp Lemonnier has approximately 4,000 U.S. troops deployed there continuously 
and is augmented by U.S. allies such as France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain providing 
support to multiple United Nations and national missions in the region.82 China 
constructed its first overseas military base in the same location as the United States largest 
base in Africa, Camp Lemonnier.  
The dual presence of U.S. and PLAN military capabilities highlights the importance 
this location has in the region and why it is a perfect candidate to have the Wei Qi model 
applied. The model will examine the investments made by China within Djibouti, how 
Djibouti is important to the success of the BRI, its counter-piracy efforts and what impact 
Chinese presence there will have for CCP power projection. Application of the model will 
also show the effectiveness of Chinese influence and the way in which the unique 
environment of Djibouti balances the disparity in economic strengths between the two.  
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A. APPLYING THE WEI QI MODEL 
1. Where Is the Case Study On the Board? In the Game? 
 
Figure 6. Representation of Djibouti on the Game Board 
On the Wei Qi board Djibouti is located in the outermost circumference of the center 
section and can be considered a cornerstone for developing territory in anticipation of the 
endgame (see Figure 6). The Mediterranean Sea can be imagined as the exact center of the 
board, living up to its name as the Middle Sea. The Mediterranean as geographical 
representation of the center makes sense at it is where China’s endgame and desired expansion 
will meet the US’s grand strategy and areas of traditional influence (Western Europe).83 That 
is to say, the PRC wants to influence and control the natural resources it needs in the Middle 
East and Africa, but also to maintain access to the markets in Europe. Djibouti’s position on 
the Horn of Africa allows it to provide a key node for the PRC to expand regionally, both 
economically and militarily. Djibouti’s strategic importance is omni-directional: it holds 
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access to the waterways leading up toward the Suez Canal, has the ability to help support 
naval presence in the eastern Indian ocean, and is a safe beachhead in order to project into the 
African continent. This strategic importance is why seven different nations, besides the PRC, 
have forces in Djibouti to fight piracy, keep the 18-mile-wide Bam al-Mandeb open and 
conduct operations throughout Africa.84 
2. What Is the Amount of and Use of Zheng and Qi in the Area? 
The Chinese zheng in Djibouti is represented by its main overseas power: economic 
investments in infrastructure via the BRI. Uniquely, in Djibouti a continued military presence 
and development of increased facilities is also a zheng. As of 2017, Chinese investments 
account for U.S. $1.4 billion, or 40%, of major Djiboutian infrastructure projects.85 As the 
Center for Naval Analysis points out, “Chinese state-owned firms built three of Djibouti’s 
largest—and most potentially transformative—infrastructure projects… Doraleh 
Multipurpose Port, the Ethiopia-Djibouti Railway and the Ethiopia-Djibouti Water 
pipeline.”86 These three projects will double the capacity of goods Djibouti can handle, 
connect Ethiopia (a resource/ market interest of China) to the sea and overcome a natural 
resource scarcity that has restricted Djibouti from expansion and development. These 
Chinese-backed projects are significantly benefiting the lives of everyday Djiboutians by 
increasing the number of jobs available in the nation, while also cementing PRC presence in 
the region.87 
The PLAN has had a near continuous presence in the region since 2009, when they 
started to participate in counterpiracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden.88 This commitment to 
counter-piracy and a growing economic relationship was the catalyst for increasing Chinese 
facilities in Djibouti; the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs citing the need for logistical 
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support as one of the main reasons for the establishment of China’s first overseas military 
base.89 Immediately after the base was officially opened on August 1, 2017, the PLAN 
conducted live fire exercises in the Gulf of Aden.90 The port facilities and storage areas have 
been critical logistical hubs for PRC participation not only in UN peacekeeping missions 
throughout the Horn of Africa but also in the conduction of Joint exercises with Iran and 
Russia.91 
The Qi, or unusual way in which China is applying force in Djibouti, is in the fine 
print of its economic agreements on infrastructure and trade. The main bank financing the 
majority of the Djiboutian infrastructure projects is the state-owned enterprise Export-Import 
Bank of China, or China Eximbank.92 China Eximbank is charged by the CCP with funding 
projects to secure contracts and acquire assets abroad in order to further stimulate the 
exponential growth of the PRC’s economy. This is done partially by the bank requiring 
additional contracts in Chinese goods and services in order to approve the infrastructure loans. 
This practice of requiring additional contracts while the bank takes on major portions of the 
loan is a hallmark of predatory debt practices that PRC state owned enterprises have used to 
gain the upper hand over economically weaker nations. The best example, and one relevant 
to Djibouti, is the acquisition of Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka. In this case, the Sri Lankan 
government continually asked for loans for the construction of a new port, and despite 
negative evaluations on the prospects of profit, the PRC agreed. When Hambantota Port failed 
to develop a profit and Sri Lanka defaulted on its loans, the PRC was able to negotiate a 99-
year contract on ownership of the port and 15,000 acres of land.93 Similar behavior has been 
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observed in Djibouti, specifically on the Ethiopia-Djibouti Railway project. The government 
of Djibouti was unable to meet its financial requirements in support of this project and lost 
10% equity to a Chinese firm as compensation.  
3. Are These Forces Becoming Overwhelming with Irresistible Power 
Across All Aspects of DIME? 
Despite the significant investment by the PRC, the development of Chinese influence 
in Djibouti has not been overwhelming. According to the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), 
Djibouti is still hesitant to rely on Chinese investment, calling it a “lender of last resort” 
limiting the PRC’s economic influence over Djibouti.94 CNA also assessed that the 
government of Djibouti prefers to work through western financial services, as they are less 
likely to attempt a takeover of the facilities.95 With the predatory lending and the example of 
Hambantota Port, the government of Djibouti is necessarily cautious in balancing gains and 
risk of conducting deals with the PRC. Diplomatically, the PRC’s ability to develop the base 
and secure contracts are the main indicators of their diplomatic relationship. As the 
relationship is relatively new, there is not much reported on the status of any informational or 
culture disputes as there appears to only be an economic and security relationship for now.  
Militarily, the number of assets the PLAN has based out of the port are insignificant 
compared to the U.S. presence in the region. With the U.S. practice of maintaining a 1.5 carrier 
presence in the Fifth Fleet, at any given time, there is in the theater a full Carrier Strike Group 
with approximately 80 fighter aircraft, five support ships (Destroyers, Cruisers) and an 
Amphibious Readiness Group with its embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit of 1500 Marines. 
The PLAN Task Groups, which on average consist of three to four ships, typically an 
amphibious landing ship, a destroyer and a supply ship, are nearly always outgunned by the 
U.S. Navy.96 What can change this imbalance of military force for the PLAN is if it continues 
to develop its military relationships and interoperability with Iranian and Russian navies. 
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4. Are These Forces Developing a Favorable Situation with Great Potential 
to Achieve Political Objective? 
Diplomatically and economically, the PRC is laying the groundwork to potentially 
complicate the U.S. presence in the country, and alter the government of Djibouti’s 
preferences. If the PRC is able to refrain from repeating its actions in Hambantota, the Chinese 
investments in Djibouti will generate enough prosperity for the locals to potentially shift their 
preference toward China. China’s actions of connecting Ethiopia and its goods to the sea, in 
conjunction with its UN peacekeeping participation will also help it develop soft power appeal 
in Djibouti and throughout the region. In Wei Qi terms, the Chinese are developing territory 
through means that provide plenty of liberties and opportunities to expand their influence 
regionally while taking away opportunities from the U.S.  
Militarily, their efforts are minutely achieving a political goal of projecting presence, 
developing soft power and protecting overseas interests. The PLAN increase in capability is 
a strategy in line with Corbett vice Mahan, in that it is creating a space to develop a force large 
enough to conduct its desired mission.97 In the short term, the Chinese foreign minister has 
announced that its desired mission is the protection of trade in the region.98 In the long term, 
and in accordance with Pillsbury’s belief that the CCP has a marathon-like plan to replace the 
United States as the global hegemon. The CCP announcing its objective to serve as the 
protector of international trade allows it to become a creator of international norms and have 
the naval capability to project power ashore globally.99 Another potential political goal, and 
one that Andrew Latham argues is most prevalent is that the CCP is hoping to offshore 
balance.100 Offshore balancing is a realist approach that China as a risen power, is developing 
its military capability in Djibouti in order to force a balance of power against the United States 
outside of the South China Sea. This ability to shift the geography of the conflict provides the 
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PRC with the advantages of removing the concentration of threats off of its coast, but also 
provides a reason for increasing capability in areas of interest for the PRC.  
5. Is China Taking and Maintaining the Initiative? Is There a Void to Fill? 
While the PRC is following western examples of a foreign base in Djibouti, it is taking 
the initiative by focusing its efforts on required infrastructure projects that are designed to 
improve the life of Djiboutians.101 The trifecta of railway, port and water pipeline projects 
should increase trade and the quality of life of the locals. The PRC is filling a void that the 
government itself was not able to develop, and one that the U.S. and its allies have not actively 
pursued. Installment of a permanent Chinese presence in Djibouti is also taking the initiative, 
as it is critical in providing a non-US controlled line of communication via the BRI.  
6. Is the Relationship Between China and the Country a Ko? 
Chinese investment and its increased military capability have not developed the 
relationship to the importance of a ko, but continued progression may mean a shift in the 
future. If aggressive debt policies and control measures on the port facility and infrastructure 
projects continue, it could be the tipping point for a turning Djibouti into a virtual Chinese 
colony. If the PRC were to acquire the port of Djibouti, similar to Hambantota, it potentially 
could attempt to remove the U.S. from the nation through legal or political means. This is 
unlikely; however, Djibouti’s importance as a bastion of Chinese power projection in both the 
Middle East and Africa will only continue to increase as China looks further abroad.  
7. What Is the Framework That the Forces Are Providing? What Strategy 
Is Being Used? What Liberties Do the Pieces Provide? 
The investment in Djibouti by the PRC is similar to the Wei Qi strategy of a ladder, in 
which a string of stones is arrayed across a large swath of area in order to build upon each 
other and develop a large territory. Djibouti is a core node in the Maritime Silk Road, see 
Figure 7, as it protects the connection between Europe and China via the Bam al-Mandeb. 
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Figure 7.  BRI Network November 2020102
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The liberties provided by basing out of Djibouti include providing the PLAN the 
ability to project force in order to help China protect its interests in the Middle East and 
support the New Silk Road as it passes through Iran and flows through Gwadar, Pakistan. 
Djibouti also provides the PLA with the ability to project power throughout Africa, as 
evidenced by its involvement in UN missions in Sudan and South Sudan. This can mean 
an expansion of its peacekeeping operations, its counterterrorism operations, non-combat 
evacuation operations, and increase its ability to collect intelligence throughout the region. 
B. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The investments and military presence in Djibouti provide the CCP and its military, 
the PLA, the ability to project influence on three continents from a single location. The Wei 
Qi model implies that this move is significantly building liberties for the PRC and its desire 
to protect its interests overseas. However, it is only conducting the same actions as the 
United States, whose proximity limits the extent on which the PRC can develop territory. 
The CCP’s SOE behavior of financing with strings attached limits the amount of trust the 
Djiboutian government will have with them. This shaky trust provides opportunity for the 
United States to limit the territory gained by the PRC, by investing and further developing 
the military relationship with Djibouti. As with the CNA’s recommendation, the way ahead 
for the United States to undermine PRC gains is to support foreign direct investment, 
increase military exercises and training, increase professional military education of 
Djiboutian officers (such as sending them to NPS), increase port visits, and increase arms 
sales and weapons transfers.103 The United States has a strong position in Djibouti, and 
while recent Chinese investments help build favor for them, the U.S. only needs to redirect 
its attention and finances to Djiboutian interests to nullify Chinese gains.  
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V. CONCLUSION  
A. INTERPRETATION OF THE MODEL 
Wei Qi may not be an exact mirror of CCP grand strategy due to the complexities 
of the real world, but the ancient board game is a useful heuristic device for understanding 
the scope and major contours of PRC regional expansionism. This thesis developed a 
model based on the concepts of shi and Wei Qi gameplay that when applied to the nations 
of Australia and Djibouti presented the following findings.  
Australia and Djibouti are strategically relevant for the PRC and its desire to 
achieve its national rejuvenation. Australian natural resources, top tier universities and 
wealthy market are all necessary for the PRC to continue its economic rise. For the PRC, 
success in Australia is a roadmap of success in other democratic, ethnic European markets. 
Djibouti strategically, is an important lynchpin for protection of PRC interests in three 
continents and success of President Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative. Djibouti provides the 
PRC a secure port and access to African resources and market, the Suez and Europe, while 
also linking the PRC with its allies and customers in the Middle East.  
In both cases, despite significant financial investments, the PRC’s ability to exert 
influence is limited due to an element of distrust caused by PRC behavior. In Australia, 
this distrust is directly linked to PRC interference in Australian domestic politics via 
corrupting official, CCP domestic policies and aggressive international behavior. The 
CCP’s is further undermining its ability when it uses economic punishments against 
Australia when it adheres to its liberal democratic principles and criticizes them on the 
international stage. In Djibouti, a nation whose commodity and economic prosperity is 
linked to its geo-strategic position is distrustful of the aggressive, debt trap contracts that 
come with Chinese business dealings. The disparity between building infrastructure and 
building trust will continue to restrict the ability of the PRC to develop successful soft 
power.  
The model revealed that in both cases the United States already possessed a 
significant position and relationship with each nation. This pre-positioning means that the 
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United States has the advantage in each location to outperform the PRC in soft power gains. 
In both, the proverbial “shoot themselves in the foot” can be applied to PRC actions, hence 
the United States can take advantage of this by investing money, material and most 
importantly time in strengthening relationships with each nation. For Australia, the shared 
history and close cultural ties can be bolstered by providing more economic opportunities. 
For Djibouti, the United States should focus on the interests of the small nation and in 
developing not just infrastructure but all means available in order to enrich the lives and 
security of everyday Djiboutian.  
The Wei Qi model further reveals that despite the limits it faces, the CCP will still 
continue to invest time and energy in these locations due to their overall gain and support 
to Chinese overseas interest. The model reveals that in each location, the PRC has not 
created a corner or sphere of influence immune to United State influence, but instead these 
are pockets of competition that have greater impact on the global Great Power Competition.  
B. WEI QI MODEL AND FUTURE ANALYSIS 
This thesis found that the application of Wei Qi as a model for understanding 
strategic thought does possess benefits for an analyst or military decision maker. The game, 
as it was designed to, forces a player to look at events going on not only in their immediate 
context, but for the gains it provides in the future. This effect is not unique to Wei Qi but it 
is strongly reinforced by its gameplay of singular movements, that cannot be taken back or 
moved. This is similar to the real world in that actions have consequences and real 
permanent ones at that.  
The benefits derived from this heuristic device are ones that should be incorporated 
throughout the military and our planning process. As such, it is recommended that this 
game be introduced and encouraged among the military as a method of developing lateral 
thinking, the ability to see problems on a bigger scale and finally, to solve unique problems 
simultaneously. Further research on the topic of Wei Qi and its relation to Chinese strategy 
should not be on developing a one-for-one transfer model, but in developing the ability to 
read a situation and understand its complexities.  
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